PERSPECTIVES ON PERENNIAL
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
A

REVIEW

FRIEDMANN,

OF

E.

BODENHEIMER,

LEGAL THEORY,

TREATISE ON JUSTICE, W.

5TH

ED.,

AND

B.

WORTLEY,

JURISPRUDENCE.

Joseph J. Darby*
To a certain degree, law is a reflection of the social
environment in which it exists. Since a multiplicity of forces is
constantly at work to produce stresses and tensions that serve to
keep society in an incessant state of flux, the law also finds itself
in continual need to adjust and readjust. Traditionally, the
contemplative jurist in search of aid in the solution of novel
social problems has turned to philosophy. Despite the increasing
popularity of the auxiliary disciplines of sociology, psychology
and other behavioral sciences, it is inevitable that philosophy will
continue to rank high on the list of extra-legal source materials
which the lawyer can utilize in adapting his legal knowledge to
the demands of a technotronic and dynamic social configuration.
The books under review represent the contributions of three
philosophically oriented jurists to the understanding and possible
solution of a whole series of contemporary and eternal problems.
Bodenheimer has put together a well balanced and harmonious
study of the nature of justice, probing seriously the feasibility of
articulating certain carefully selected and objectively valid
criteria of justice. Friedmann, in this latest edition of a work
which first appeared in 1944 and which has since become a
classic, continues to examine socio-legal reality through the
prism of Radbruchian relativism and Holmsian ethical
agnosticism. Wortley, an English scholar who is clearly
concerned with the challenges to which his country is now
exposed in relation to the Civil Law systems of the Common
Market countries, has reviewed a number of topics from this
somewhat tendentious and comparative point of view, stressing
the universality of the basic legal concepts of Western
Christendom.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.S. Georgetown University; M.A., Ph.D. Columbia University; Dr. lur. University of Cologne; LL.B. Fordham

University.

SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6

Since it would be impossible in a review of this nature to
discuss more than a handful of the ideas raised, treated and
suggested in these three books, the following topical arrangement
has been selected with a view toward presenting a comparative

insight into the philosophical views of the authors.
I.

THE BASIS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF PENAL TREATMENT

The quality of life in a country may be measured by the way
in which the state handles those of its citizens who are accused of
crime.' In no other field of law is the conflict between the claims

of individual right and social need brought into focus more
dramatically than in the area of criminal justice. For it is
precisely here that the state, acting through its representatives
and agents, is moving to deprive the individual citizen of his
liberty and property. And for what reason? What purpose is
being served by the administration of criminal justice? Is there a
significant discrepancy between the ends which the state is
theoretically seeking to achieve and the actual practice
corresponding to the realities of criminal law and procedure in
action? These and other questions running to the essence, nature
and function of our system of criminal law are intimately related

to the basis for the imposition of penal treatment
We are witnessing today a whole series of events which
reflect the profound changes which are affecting the moral

consciousness of large and noteworthy sections of our society.' It
I. According to Justice Abe Fortas, Winston Churchill once made this observation,
Fortas, Dangers to the Rule of Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 957, 958 (1968). It was subsequently
made by Chief Justice Warren in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962) in
a reference to the 1956 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School:
delivered by Justice Walter V. Schaefer and reprinted as Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. I, 26 (1956).
2. It has become commonplace to take notice of the remarkable growth of interest
in crime, criminal law and criminal procedure in United States universities. As Jerome
Hall, Theft, Law and Society-1968, 54 A.B.A.J. 960, 963-64 (1968) has pointed out, a
good deal of what passes for socio-legal research in this area is little more than highly
subsidized fact grubbing which only too often comes up with an end product in the
nature of "a tiny mouse" for all interested observers to view. One of the great
weaknesses of the sociological approach to law is that the enormity of the undertaking
necessitates a division of labor which often results in the postponement, and even
complete avoidance, of axiological conclusions suggested by the accumulated and
processed data. C: Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law With a Critique of
Sociological Jurisprudence,35 HARv. L. REV. 838, 851-52 (1922).
3. The phenomenon is international. It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the
crisis in authority as evidence of some form of social "sickness" which will go away in
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is possible that we are standing on the threshold of a new era,

with all the hope and anxiety that that term connotes.
Encouraged by skeptical dissenters to think through basic
concepts to their essential foundations, many people, especially
among the youth and disaffected minorities, are challenging the
propriety of established and previously never questioned ways of
doing things Some of the skeptical have become radical,
rejecting outright the basic premises and moral precepts on
which society and state are foundedP They have become spiritual
revolutionaries who, depending on constitution and temperament,

either "drop out" of society to pursue existentialist joy, or join
together with those of similar persuasion to work toward the
destruction of the established order. Constructive reform to these

spiritual revolutionaries is undesirable and useless. A certain
nihilism, quite akin to anarchy, is mixed in with the anger and
time if treated with adequate doses of rest and relaxation. Vigorous and prompt action by
those in positions of authority is necessary in order to channel the revolution fed by rising
expectations into positive and constructive activities. At the same time, responsible
community leaders should identify and remove the causes for just and reasonable
grievances, acting in concert with responsible complainants if possible, acting alone if
necessary. For an example of a determined and decisive policy, see Theodore M.
Hesburgh, Dealing With Campus Chaos, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 3,
1969, at 34.
4. The study of sociology has been instrumental in encouraging this kind of
skeptical dissent. August Comte, acknowledged founder of the "'science of social facts,"
was searching for a scientific dogma whose common acceptance would give rise to a new
social order. Cf E. GILSON, THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE, at 257 (1937).
Similarly, compare the contemporary appraisal of S. Lipset, The Political Thrust
Motivating Campus Turmoil, SATURDAY REVIEW, March I, 1969, at 23-24, with H.
MARCUSE,

REASON AND

REVOLUTION

327-28 (1968): "Comte explicitly stated that the

term 'positive' by which he designated his philosophy implied educating men to take a
positive attitude toward the prevailing state of affairs. Positive philosophy was going to
affirm the existing order against those who asserted the need for 'negating' it." Marcuse
nevertheless recognizes the critical spirit which is promoted by the study of sociology and
other social science disciplines. In an interview published as "Marcuse Defines New Left
Line," he states: "there is a vast difference in behavior between the students in the social
sciences and the humanities on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other . . . in
the study of these social sciences they have learned a great deal. The nature of power, the
existence of the forces behind the facts. They have also become very much aware of what
goes on in societies. And this awareness is absolutely impossible for the vast majority of
the population, which is, in some sense, inside the social machine." N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1968, (Magazine) at 29, 92.
5. The radicalism of recent vintage has given rise to considerable comment. See, 364
ANNALS (1966), and especially Forster, Violence on the Fanatical LeJt and Right, 364
ANNALS 141-48 (1966). See also Bradley, What Businessmen .\eed to Know About the
Student Left. 46 HARV. Bus. RIuV. 49 (1968); Glaser, Marcuse and the New German
Lefi, 20 NAT'L REV. 649 (1968). For a sober appraisal by one of our most respected
diplomats see G. KENNAN, DEMOCRACY AND THE STUDENT LEFT

(1968).

SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6

frustration which accompanies involuntary membership in an
impersonal society, the decision-making processes of which are
deemed to be both too complicated and too remote for the

dissenter to relate to in any meaningful fashion.'
Does criminal law have an important role to play in all of
this? How is the "spirit of the times" affecting the substantive
and procedural law of crimes? What can we expect of criminal law
in the future? In the 1967 Report by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, very little space is
devoted to considering the possibilities of improving the substan-

tive criminal law. 7 Not that the President's Commission was satisfied with the existing state of affairs. A shift in the moral sense of

the United States academic legal community has prompted its
more articulate spokesmen to argue for substantive changes in the
law relating to so-called "victimless crimes" and other offenses

involving conduct which is deemed to fall more properly within
the cognizance of other public agencies of social control. The

main point here is that the President's Commission is
underscoring the limits to the results which can be expected from
6. One is reminded of the nihilistic and anarchistic movements that swept through
certain strata of pre-revolutionary Russian society. In Fathersand Solis (1862), Turgenev
created Bazarov, man of action and hero of the young generation, a thoroughgoing
nihilist who rejected everything of the then existing social structure. Cf I.S. TURGENEV,
ROMANY 421-588 (1961).
Other Russian intellectual figures in the nihilist-anarchist tradition include: Michael
Bakunin (1814-1876), an outspoken anarchist totally opposed to any system of authority;
Sergei Nechaev (1847-1882), a protege of Bakunin's, remembered more for the remarkable
revolutionary code of ethics which he expressed in his The Revotutionary s Catedisn
than for his anarchism. (J. MAX NOMAD, APOSTLES OF REVOLUTION 214-56 (1961);
Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), a nobleman who, despite a family geneology that could be
traced back to the time of Rurik, was passionately opposed to the Tsarist regime of his
day. P. KROPOTKIN, MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONIST (1962); Compare the following
statement by Dmitry I. Pisarev: (1840-1868), literary critic and destroyer of the idealistic
myth of Pushkin, in CLARKSON, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 323 (1961): "Here is the
ultimatum of our camp: What can be smashed, must be smashed; whatever survives a
blow has value, whatever flies to smithereens is rubbish; in any case, smash right and left,
it will and can do no harm," with DER SPIEGEL. Feb. 10, 1969, at 24 where the following
statement, painted on the classroom wall at the University of Hamburg appears: "Die
Freude an der Zerstoerung ist eine Schoepferische Freude." See generally PAUL AVRICII,
THE RUSSIAN ANARCHISTS (1967).
7. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S

COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 126-27 (1967);
THE COURTS: A

TASK FORCE REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 97-107 (1967). The Report consists of
nine volumes of informative material on various aspects of crime, e.g., Organized Crime,
Drunkeness, Narcotics and Drug Abuse, etc., plus an additional volume representing a
condensation of the most significant features of the other nine Task Force Reports.
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the administration of criminal law. Impatient observers,
dissatisfied with the effectiveness and financial efficiency of
criminal law in the prevention of crime, have been attracted to
the promises of other behavioral approaches to the problem of
controlling, reducing and hopefully eliminating socially harmful
conduct?
The prevention of crime is clearly a desirable societal goal,

but thinking and responsible citizens are entitled to ask our
social engineers how they propose to achieve it. What price in

human values are they prepared to pay in leading us down the
road to freedom from want and fear? At stake here, of course,

are the fundamental values of our civilization. A shift in the
disposition of antisocial conduct from punishment under the
criminal law to treatment under administrative discretion runs

the risk of an eventual breakdown in state respect for the dignity
of the individualP
The model of a self-reliant, free and independent citizen,

ready, willing and able to take care of himself, even after he has
fallen into the net of criminal justice, is an important component

in the effective implementation of the rule of law. Well-meaning
efforts to create another model based on an indefensible

disciplinary amalgamation of sociology, psychology and
medicine are bound in the long run to perform a disservice in the
building of a more humane society. The model of the dependent,
deprived and irresponsible victim of society who is deemed to be
in need of treatment from one of the "helping" organs of public

administration is a necessary conceptual prerequisite to the
establishment of the technocratic and therapeutic state. 10 A
8. For a balanced study, see H.

PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

(1968).
9. Thus, the issue raised by Herbert Wechsler, when he asked which "behavior can
be prevented by the methods of the criminal law, without causing more harmful
consequences than the prevention achieved is worth?" may also be projected into the area
of noncriminal administrative controls. Wechsler, A Caveat on Crine Control, 27 J.
CRINI. L. 629, 630 (1937). A valuable discussion of these and other aspects of penal
treatment appears in J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION

4-20 (1940).

10. State paternalism may be benevolent or despotic, but it always tends to restrict
individual freedom of choice and action. Harold Berman views Soviet law as essentially
parental, treating "the individual as a child or youth, as a dependent member who needs
to be trained and guided in the interests of the whole as conceived by the state." H.
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 380 (1963). Soviet jurists are less than enthusiastic
about this characterization of their legal system. See V.A. Tumanov, Failure to
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personal model so conceived is poorly equipped to demand
respect for his civil liberties. He will be deprived of his personal
freedom and subjected to organized attempts to re-make his
personality in order to meet the felt needs of society. His
benefactors by definition know what is best for him, and his
protestations to the contrary will only be interpreted by his
guardians to be signs of poor judgment."
Friedman is clearly alert to the potential dangers to
individual liberty which are inherent in the exercise of broad
administrative discretion. Writing in 1959, almost a decade prior
to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Application of Gault,'2 he stated:
As corrective and educational procedures have become
intermingled with criminal and quasi-criminal processes, so
the fear has grown that benevolent, but autocratic authority
may be able to deprive persons falling under its jurisdiction of
liberty, for indefinite periods, without the judicial safeguards
attending criminal trial. Criticism has been particularly
vociferous in states which, like California, have gone far in
the substitution of corrective for criminal procedures in
regard to juvenile offenders. The title of a recent article is:
'We need not deny justice to our children' while a California
judge has written that the juvenile court is 'fast developing
into a complete system of Fascism, as dangerous to our
institutions as Communism.' Such complaints are based on
the vagueness or elasticity in the procedure of a juvenile court
in regard to such essential safeguards as the powers of the
police to arrest, the precise formulation of the offence, the
right to trial by jury, the right to refuse testimony, the
acceptance of hearsay evidence or the right to counsel.'11

Understand or Unwillingness to Understand, 4 SOVIET LAW AND GOVERNMENT 3, 8-9
(1966), where the author labels Berman's "paternal" theory "a libel against Soviet
man." Truth would seem to be a good defense to libel, even where the charge is made in
a professional journal. c('j Berman, A Reply to V.A. Tunanov, 4 SOVIET LAW AND
GOVIRNMlENT 11 (1966).

II. Thomas S. Szasz has dramatically called attention to the potential abuse of civil
rights which is contained in a paternalistic statist psychiatry. T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY
AND PSYCHIATRY (1963). For a tendentious attack on Szasz, compare Diamond, Book
Review, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 899 (1964) with Jay Haley's rehabilitative effort, Book Note,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 720 (1965).
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIhETY 183 (1959).
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The Gault case and its progeny 14 represent the initial steps of
United States jurisprudence in attacking the problem sketched by
Friedmann. But in guaranteeing to the youthful offender certain
carefully selected Constitutional rights and privileges during the
initial stages of his contact with the law enforcement machinery
of the state, our high courts are placing the system of juvenile
justice on the horns of a dilemma.
On the one hand, the extension of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights to youthful offenders serves
to protect them from arbitrary and unfair procedure. On the
other hand, it brings with it a good deal of formal, contentious
and technical argument into the whole process, so that quite
probably it is now necessary to abandon completely the notion
that juvenile delinquency proceedings are non-adversary. When
the youthful offender receives the process which the United
States Supreme Court has held to be his due, it is problematical
that the interpersonal dynamics of at least the adjudicatory phase
of the proceedings can contribute in any significant way to the
noble goals of rehabilitation and 'guidance for the wayward
child.'
To be sure, Justice Fortas, author of the Court's opinion in
Gault, was careful to point out that the holding in that case was
not intended to impair any of those "unique benefits" of the
juvenile system." And addressing himself to the question of
informality, Fortas, citing the results of social science studies as
authority, came to the not surprising conclusion that a formal
and fair procedure contributes more to the rehabilitation of the
youthful offender than one which is informal and unfair."6 The
same holds true, of course, for the adult criminal, and the logic
of this argument might be pushed even into the post-conviction
correctional phase, an area which will continue to receive the
increasing attention of the courts. This is so, because, as
Friedmann has correctly observed, the solution to the abuse of
administrative discretion is not to abolish the administration, but
rather to work out safeguards against such abuse within the
14. For example, In re Teters, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 951, 70 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1968),
noted in 6 SAN l)ll:Go
L. Ri:v. 128 (1969); In re Dennis M.. 70 Adv. Cal. 460, 450 P.2d
296, 75 Cal. Rptr. I (1969).
15. 387 U.S. I, 22 (1967). Separate treatment in a denominated "civil proceeding"
would theoretically still avoid the social stigma of criminality.
16. Id. at 26.
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framework of the rule of law.17 This is a tremendous task, but
one which must be mastered if we are to succeed in guaranteeing
a minimum of order with justice in an age when the inevitable
solution to a whole series of profound social and economic
problems involves the intervention of the state into the private
18
lives of its citizens.
State administrative intervention into the criminal process is
not a major source of concern for Wortley in the volume under
review. Indeed, he seems to have embraced the idea that criminal
offenders are primary subjects for state administrative therapy,
Speaking of the role of the state in the application of penal
treatment, he reasons:
A doctor seeks not to cause the death of, but rather to cure
his patient, however unpleasant that patient may be; the State
should regard itself as being in the same position.
The remark was directed toward the issue of capital punishment,
but the sentiment is equally valid as a basis for the imposition of
state control over the liberty of the criminal offender even in noncapital cases. Consistent with a therapeutic approach to the
tasks of penal treatment, Wortley considers medical men to be in
a superior position to laymen in identifying legally relevant
mental abnormalities. When the issue before the court is whether
the litigant is capable of a free act, Wortley explains:
Legal responsibility, merit and demerit, are then matters
which depend on the conception of the possibility of a free
act. The exceptional cases, where there is no possibility of a
free act, can be recognized by medical men who can detect,
not only obvious drunks and epileptics, but also
neurasthenics, hysterics, abnormal people, psychopaths and
neurotics who may appear to others to be normal. Advances
in psychology and psychiatry have, logically, led to extending
the categories of persons who are not capable of meeting the
full responsibility which the law presumes....!1
17. FRIID'IANN. supra note 13, at 185, 410-12. FRIEDIANN. LEGAL TIIORY. 42729 (5th ed., 1967) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN, THEORY].
18. "The welfare of the people in particular has always been the alibi of tyrants, and
it provides the further advantage of giving the servants of tyranny a good conscience,"
Albert Camus, as found in T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 19 (1965).
19. B.A. WORTLEY, JURISPRUDENCE 442 (1967).
20. Id. at 357. For a similarly optimistic estimation of the value of psychiatric
testimony, see Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59
YALE L.J. 1324, 1338 (1950).
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This is saying a good deal more for the abilities of our

expert witnesses than is justified from the record.2' Moreover, it
seems to assume a frictionless and harmonious relationship

between the testimony proferred by the medical-psychiatric
witness and its usefulness to the trier of fact. In reality, it has
been a task of enormous proportions to fashion a workable
system of evidence, satisfactory both to those responsible for the
administration of a value-laden system of law as well as to those
sometimes value-free social and physicial scientists, whereby the
talents of the latter can be applied meaningfully to the judicial

process.
As an example of this, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, perhaps the most venturesome of our

appellate courts in experimenting with new and untried
substantive and procedural approaches to the problem of
criminal capacity,22 has recently, after a period of granting to the
21. Compare Hall, Science. Coninion Sense, and Criminal Law Reform, 49 IOWA
L. REv. 1044, 1049 (1964): "whatever expertise psychiatrists have, it does not
inhere in any special competence to recognize persons suffering from extreme mental
illness." In United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1961), Judge
Holtzoff, citing Connecticut Mt. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, II U.S. 612 (1884) and
Queenan v. Territory of Oklahoma, 190 U.S. 548 (1903), held that a lay witness may
express an opinion based on his own observations as to whether a person is of sound or
unsound mind. The court there cited with approval the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in Attorney General Jbr the State oJ South Australia v. Brown A.C. 432, 452
(1960), where it was judicially observed that "'The previous and contemporaneous acts of
the accused may often be preferred to medical theory." For other cases which have
recognized the correctness of permitting a lay witness to testify from personal observation
concerning the mental competency of the defendant in a criminal matter see State v.
Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (Ore. 1950), noted favorably in Pederson, The Opinion Evidence
Rule in Oregon as it Relates to Cases Involving Medical Matters and Insanity, 33 ORE.
L. REv. 243, 262-71 (1954); Noble v. Sigler, 244 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D. Neb. 1965),
ajj'd 351 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1965); Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408, 411-12.
414-15 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 951 (1966). The problem has provoked
considerable editorial commentary in the legal periodicals. C. Dieden & Gasparich,
Psychiatric Evidence and Full Disclosure in the Criminal Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 543
(1964); Symposium, The Doctor in Court-Expert Medical Testimon)v, 13 MD. L. REV.
283 (1953); Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 MINN. L. REV. 235
(1955); Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews as Evidence: The Role of the Psychiatrist in
Court-Some Suggestions and Case Histories, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 853 (1962);
Lassen, The Psychologist as an Expert Witness in Assessing Mental Disease or Deject, 50
A.B.A.J. 239 (1964). In California, Section 870 of the Evidence Code permits certain
qualified lay witnesses to testify as to a person's sanity, CAL. Evio. CODE § 870 (West
1966). In Pfingst v. Goetting, 96 Cal. App. 2d 293, 215 P.2d 93 (1950), even an
unqualified lay witness testified. This was held to be admissible, not as an opinion on
mental sanity, but rather to show rational or irrational appearance.
22. It is sometimes said that the Durham "Product" Rule, adopted in Durham v.
United States. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), is the same as that embraced by New
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medical-psychiatric witness the greatest leeway in expressing
himself on the witness stand, restricted the scope of such expert
testimony. Suffering from a syndrome of "conclusory labels,"
and fearful that the expert witness was preempting the essential
function of the trier of fact, the court, speaking through Justice
Bazelon, said:
The trial judge should limit the psychiatrists' use of medical
labels-schizophrenia, neurosis, etc. It would be undesirable,
as well as difficult, to eliminate completely all medical labels,
since they sometimes provide a convenient and meaningful
method of communication. But the trial judge should insure
that their meaning is explained to the jury and, as much as
possible, that they are explained in a way which relates their
meaning to the defendant.2?
The final chapter in this socio-legal experiment will never be
written. Restless dissatisfaction with the results produced by the
adaptation of new tests for criminal capacity to ageless patterns
of criminal behavior may someday prompt an agonizing and
sobering reappraisal of the rationality and value of the much
criticized M'Naghten rule.2 4 Indeed, there are signs that even
Judge Bazelon seems to be having second thoughts about the
wisdom of Durham2 in opening up the legal issue of criminal
capacity to the probing scalpel of the behavioral scientists. He
concluded his opinion in Washington v. United States with the
following personal observations:
It may be that this instruction [restricting the scope of
psychiatric testimony] will not significantly improve the
Hampshire in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). The Durham court itself referred to its
"Product" Rule as "not unlike" New Hampshire's. In a perceptive article, Reid,
Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367
(1960), the author points out that, although virtually identical in language, the New
Hampshire and the Durham "'Product" Rule differ in that the former is a rule of
evidence governing the scope of evidence to be admitted, while the latter states a rule of
substantive law. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took
cognizance of this in Blocker v. United States. 288 F.2d 853, 857 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
23. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
24. M'Naghten Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). If the future should witness a
return to the rationality of M'.Vaghten, much of the credit therefore will be due to those
legal scholars who understood the nature and spirit of our Anglo-American system of
Criminal Law and who defended it against the seductive embrace of irrationalism. Cy. J.
HALL. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449-528 (2nd ed. 1960): Mueller, Mens
Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. 'A. L. REV. 34 (1955).
25. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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adjudication of criminal responsibility. Then we may be
forced to consider an absolute prohibition on the use of
conclusory legal labels. Or it may be that psychiatry and the
other social and behavioral sciences cannot provide sufficient
data relevant to a determination of criminal responsibility no
matter what our rules of evidence are. If so, we may be forced
to eliminate the insanity defense altogether, or refashion it in a
way which is not tied so tightly to the medical model

. .

. But

at least we will be able to make that decision on the basis of
an informed experience. For now the writer is content to join
the court in this first step:'6
Since Bazelon did not then have the opportunity to
elaborate on his concept of a legal system from which the
defense of insanity would be altogether eliminated, it is difficult
to envisage the realization of that in the concrete. To do so
might very well represent a retreat into the utilitariansim of
absolute liability which was temporarily popularized by Justice
Oliver W. Holmes.27 Bodenheimer, aided by the perceptive
insights of Professor Jerome Hall 28 has contributed a very
valuable discussion of this aspect of Holmesian penology:
Holmes' postivism was accompanied by a strong belief in
psychic determinism which strengthened his conviction that
personal culpability should not be made the foundation of
criminal liability .... Holmes felt that an accused criminal,
after having been driven into his crime by forces beyond his
control, could be compared to a soldier marched into battle
and sacrificed if necessary, to the interests of the state. 'The
law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an
end, and uses him as a tool to increase the general welfare at
his own expense,' and Holmes considered this course of action
perfectly proper.?
The abolition of the defense of insanity would open the door
to the possibility of abandoning any and all tests "of guilt and
moral responsibility in favour of a purely utilitarian and socially
determined elimination or confinement of persons dangerous to
society."' 0 With this theory it is possible to punish the sane
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

390 F.2d at 457, n.33.

W.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1923).
HALL, supra note 24, at 147-170.
E. BODENHEIMER, TREATISE ON JUSTICE 203 (1967).
FRIEDIANN. THEORY. supra note 17, at 6 1.
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together with the insane,3 or in the alternative, to involuntarily
treat administratively determined dangerous or potentially
dangerous individuals with various measures of social hygiene.
As Friedmann has correctly observed:
Such a philosophy can lead to the exposure of weakling
children-as in ancient Sparta-or to the extermination,
confinement or sterilization of entire nations, races or other
groups of people as hostile or obnoxious to society-a
philosophy largely practised
in National
Socialist
32
Germany.
To some, such an observation may seem to be an
intellectual gratuity, too obvious to merit treatment in a book on
jurisprudence. If only that assumption were true! Unfortunately,
as Santayana so pungently put it: "Those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it." For those who never knew,
as well as for those who knew and who have since forgotten,
it is necessary to emphasize the potentiality for evil which is
latent in a legal system inspired by expedient utilitarianism and
divorced from a serious and meaningful commitment to civilized
33
standards of morality, ethics and justice.
Bodenheimer makes this point quite effectively in his
chapter on "Penal Justice. ' 34 Before an individual can be
convicted of a crime, the state has the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that he, by a voluntary act, was the human
agency by which some legally proscribed social harm was caused.
In addition, and most important of all, the state has to prove the
requisite mens rea, or blameworthy state of mind. To find a
person guilty of crime without first establishing a conscious and
knowing intention to do harm to some legally protected personal
or proprietary interest is, however expedient it may seem to be as
a device to take some of the work load from the weary shoulders
of the prosecutor, unfair and unjust. It means to sacrifice a
morally innocent actor in the hope of thereby satisfying some
social claim which is deemed to be overriding. As Bodenheimer
argues in his lucid discussion of the theoretical aspects of strict
31. As used here, the words "sane" and "insane" are intended to have legal, as
opposed to medical, significance.
32. FRIEDMANN, THEORY. supra note 17, at 61-62.
33. G. HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM

(1966).

34. BODENHEIMER, supra note 28, at 175-225.
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liability in the criminal law, such a philosophical position is

"wholly indefensible upon considerations of justice.": 5

The rationale for the imposition of punishment on those
who have been convicted of crime is that they are morally
responsible for their conduct. To be sure, a rapidly changing
technology is only one of the many factors which are at work in

influencing the attitudes and practices which prevail in our
society. At the time of this writing, some Negro leaders are
denouncing the middle class morality of white America as racist,
while at the same time demanding recognition of their own
claims to a black separatism.36 It is not difficult to identify other

sub-cultural groupings which have developed moral attitudes at
odds with those which prevail in the country at large3 To the

extent that individuals from these groupings, in acting out their
moral commitments, breach legally imposed duties which they

owe to state and society, they subject themselves to punishment
by state organs charged with the administration of criminal
justice. The fact that they truthfully believe that what they have

done is not wrong is no defense in a criminal proceeding. They
are held to be morally responsible according to the standards

and social conscience of the community. The collective voluntary
will of the community has already expressed itself in the

enactment into law of a positive prohibition of such conduct. If
35. Id. at 206.
36. N. Hare, The Case for Separatism: 'Black Perspective', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10,
1969, at 56. If recognized, such separatist claims could lead to serious problems in the
effective communication and exchange of abstract concepts such as justice and freedom
between the separated white and black groups. Such recognition, if it should involve state
action, might be unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Narrowly construed, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) must be confined to public educational facilities. Its spirit, however, is much
broader, pointing toward an integrated America in which racial differences would be a
neutral factor in the allocation of rights and duties. Moreover, separatism could lead to a
reverse discrimination by private black citizens against whites, something which, if it were
to involve the enjoyment of some public accommodation, would seem to be prohibited by
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A further danger in separatism is the possibility that it may
act as a catalyst to encourage black demands for separate institutions of justice, including
separate codes and separate courts. There is historical precedent for this in Roman,
Western Medieval and Ottoman practice. In the Ottoman Empire, the religious heads of
non-Moslem Communities called millets were responsible to the Ottoman state for the
administration of their own laws and courts. See H. GEBB & H. BOWEN, ISLAMIC
SOCIErY AND THE WEST 212-61 (1960). Whatever may be said in favor of such an
arrangement, it is strange to the United States legal tradition.
37. Informative background sketches of such groups and their leaders may be found
in D. WALKER. RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 18-33 (1968).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

the statutory enactment is not clear enough in plain language to
convey that meaning, then a court of law will hand down a
clarifying and dispositive statutory interpretation 8
Acceptance of the concept of individual moral responsibility
for personal conduct necessarily precludes a widespread
recognition by the law of the various theories that have been
developed to deny the existence of free will and to explain how
an individual's conduct is the product of forces over which he
has little or no control. Bodenheimer's treatment of determinism
and criminal responsibility" is very well done and deserves a
prominent place on assigned reading materials for students
enrolled in courses in Criminal Law. After a balanced
explanation of the theories of Kant, Freud, Bohm, Adler,
Schopenhauer, Hartmann and others, Bodenheimer concludes
that free will does exist, even if in a qualified sense:
Although the empirical evidence strongly points toward the
possibility of volitional freedom, there can be no doubt that
man's freedom of self-determination is by no means absolute. .

.

. Persons who are not mentally ill in the psychiatric or

legal sense may be incapable of offering resistance to causally
determined factors anchored in their past, which drive them
into anti-social conduct or crime. 0
This qualified existence does not prevent the imputation and
imposition of criminal responsibility in marginal cases, although
it may require legal recognition of "various shadings and degrees
of responsibility."'" Only where it can be shown that, from all
the various determinants at work in a given case, the
autonomous determinant was beyond the control of the accused,
will criminal responsibility not be imputed by the law.42
Wortley likewise is not a strict determinist. Despite his
emphasis on the penal goals of prevention and deterrence of
38. In a short but penetrating analysis see H. Hogan, The Suprene Court and
Natural Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 570, 572 (1968). The author approvingly refers us to the
ultimate and inal contemporary arbiter of our national conscience, the United States
Supreme Court. Sensitizing and directing the conscience of the nation is just one of the
functions which are performed by the United States Supreme Court. See Kauper, The
Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ o State. 21 Sw. L. J,573, 586-87 (1967).
39.
40.
41.
42.

BoDil-ANIMR. supra note 28, at 175-88.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
Id.

19693

PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE

crime,13 leading to the conclusion that the proper function of
imprisonment should be environmental reform and re-education,
he nonetheless stresses the pre-custodial importance of a
conscious, volitional act involving a choice among possibilities 4
Further, he subscribes to a system of criminal law that holds the
individual responsible for his conduct. The citizen is "presumed

to have a will and to be able to exercise it rationally. It is this
will, and this presumption of rationality, which traditional legal
philosophy ascribes to man as distinct from other animals
which, though they have will and a degree of intellect, are not

held responsible for their acts, as are human beings." 4
Friedmann, noting that "the great majority of the modern
legal systems and of legal philosophers reject the total abandon-

ment of individual responsibility as a criterion of criminal . . .
liability," 4 concludes that it is socially necessary to assume that

the individual possesses free will if a legal system is to be able to
perform the function of bringing some measure of order into the
social life of the community. Further, and to the extent that law is

a reflection of the moral consciousness of the members of society,
it must punish those who are found to be guilty of acts which shock

the conscience of the community. He stresses the need for increased
recognition of the various degrees of responsibility. From the be43. WORTLEY, supra note 19, at 436.
44. Id. at 356.
45. Id. at 357. It is important and necessary to differentiate man from the various
sub-human members of the animal kingdom. The worst kind of mischief can result from
the mistaken view "that man is only a high-grade gorilla," Brendan Brown has correctly
stated in praising Wortley for his Aristotelian, Thomistic, common law notion of the
nature of man. Brown, Book Review, 12 NATURAL L. FoRuti 232, 233 (1967). Scholars
who refer to animal behavior as relevent in explaining the human condition run the risk
that others, consciously or unconsciously accepting the analogy, will make official policy
brutually consistent with such an overemphasis on the biological side of human nature.
See D. MORRIS, THE NAKED APE (1968). For an outstanding example of such
monkeybusiness; see also Waelder, The Concept of Justice and the Quest for a Perfectlr
Just Society, 115 U. PAL.L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1966) (reference to the behavior of chickens and
baboons).
46. FRIEDIANN, THEORY. supra note 17, at 65-66. The concept of criminal guilt which
is part of Soviet law is explained by G. K. BOL'SHAKOVA (ed.), SovETSKOE YGOLOVNOF
PRAVO. CHAST' OBSCHCHAIA (Soviet Criminal Law, General Part) 124-26 (1964) as
embodying a deliberate choice to commit a socially harmful act that could have been
avoided. By substituting social danger for moral culpability, it has been possible for
Soviet jurists to continue to use the Criminal Law for maintaining order in society while
working on the formation of a new Soviet morality. See N.F. KUZNETSOVA,
UGOLOVNOE PRAVO I MORAL' (Criminal Law and Morality) (1967); H.J. BERMAN,
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 32 (1966).
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havioral sciences we can hopefully learn humility and avoid that
arrogance which often accompanies an attitude of moral
superiority:
The men who, as legislators, judges or administrators, lay
down the conditions of legal responsibility can and should do
so, not from a posture of moral superiority, but as executants
of a social and legal order which has not yet found any
alternative to the criterion of free choice between right and
wrong as a basis of legal sanctions. And it is at least possible
that, at some time in the future, such insights may modify the
collective relations between nations, which still operate in
their mutual intercourse on a psychological level that civilized
societies have long abandoned in their internal affairs, and
that mature individuals would feel ashamed to apply in their
47
personal relations.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Insights from the behavioral sciences may indeed be of aid
in the solution of the manifold human and institutional problems
which manifest themselves on the international scene. At least
many current scholarly observers believe so, and several have
attempted more or less thorough study projects with such a goal
in view.48 The authors of the books under review have devoted
some attention to international law and to past and present
attempts to impose a measure of reasoned order on international
intercourse.
Friedmann provides us with only sporadic and a largely
descriptive treatment of international law in this edition of Legal
Theory,4 9 a circumstance which to some extent at least is
explainable by reference to the fact that he has developed his
ideas on this theme elsewhere. In 1964 he published The
Changing Structure of International Law,50 an elaboration of
47. FRIEDIANN, THEORY, supra note 17, at 67.
48. (Y.SM. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); M. McDoUGAL
&

F.

FELICITANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

and W. BURKE, THE

PUBLIC

ORDER OF THE

LASSWELL & 1. V'LASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN

(1961); M.

(1962); M.
SPACE (1963); K.

OCEANS

McDOUGAL

McDOUGAL,

H.

CARLSTON, LAW

(1962).
49. It is generally the international law theories of the great legal philosophers which

AND ORGANIZATION IN WORLD SOCIETY

are described and criticized. This style is continued even in the brief last section entitled
"Legal Theory and International Society." (Y.' FRIEDIANN, THEORY, supra note 17,
at 161, 164, 188-89, 288-89, 550-55, 573-80.
50. W. FRIEDNMANN, The Changing Structure oJ International Law
[hereinafter cited as W. FRIEDMANN].

(1964)
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Chapters 14 and 15 of his 1959 title, Law in a Changing
Society.-" Quite convinced of the need of an inter-disciplinary
approach to the study of international law, 52 Friedmann to date
has wisely contented himself with a modest but nonetheless
valuable legal-political analysis of his subject matter. Drawing on
his considerable reserves in erudition, perception and judgment,
talents which he has acquired through intensive and extensive
existential and professional experience in many countries,
Friedmann has offered us the following analytical pattern with
which to study the law and international relations:
During the early formative era of international law, conflict
was deemed to be the principal instrument at the service of
national interest. Because of this, traditional theories of
international law were almost without exception devoted to a
regulation of this conflict, and took on much of the aura of
an international law of coexistence. Lately, the emphasis in
international relations has shifted from conflict to cooperation
as a means of achieving the national interest. There is already
impressive evidence of a developing international law of
cooperation, especially where the formation of regional
supranational groupings have reflected a growing awareness
of common interests and values 3
This split-level approach to international law has been
suggested by other Western scholars 54 and forms part of a
definition proferred by the late Soviet Professor E. A. Korovin:
International law can be defined as the aggregate
governing relations between States in the process
conflict and cooperation, designed to safeguard their
coexistence, expressing the will of the ruling classes

of rules
of their
peaceful
of these

51. FRIEDMANN. supra note 13, at 417-81.
52. Addressing the American Society of International Law in 1966, Friedmann
concluded: "'The essential need, in our generation, is for a greatly widened training in
international law, and an equally great extension of interdisciplinary collaboration on the
governmental, academic and private levels," reprinted as The Relevance of International
Law to the Processes of Economic and Social Development, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AII:RICAN SocIn-y ot- INTERNATIONAL LAW at 15 (1966).
53. v. FRIEDMANN, supra note 50 (thesis paraphased).
54. Schwartzenberger, Aron and Carr are mentioned as intellectual predecessors by
McDougal & Reisman, Book Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 812, n.8 (1965). F.A.
Mann suggests the Friedmann distinction between the law of coexistence and the law of
cooperation may be "'simply one of fact, i.e., between the less developed 'political' and
the infinitely more elaborate 'technical' international law." Mann, Book Review, 81
LAW Q. REV. 305, 306-307 (1965).
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by coercion applied by
States and defended in case of need
5

States individually or collectively?
Friedmann's version of it is coupled with what Falk has called a
"pragmatic idealism," '56 and with what F. A. Mann has
discerned to be "a deep sense7 of justice, including social justice,
morality and righteousness."
While praising Friedmann's contributions to international
legal study in general, other observers have been critical of
Friedmann's failure to present a well-developed theory
comprehensive enough to explain and extrapolate the world
social process in a manner that would be of aid to those engaged
in the decision making process. 8 Adept at identifying certain
aspects of social change and the impact which those have had on
norms and institutions of international law, Friedmann has yet
to formulate and defend a goal-oriented observational standpoint
from which to view the behavior of those who are subjects of
international intercourse.59
Perhaps this is because he fears that the creation of such a
substantive and methodological system would tend to produce a
certain axiological rigidity which he suspects would work to the
detriment of a beneficial and progressive social order. As
Bodenheimer has pointed out, the goal-oriented "policy-science"
approach of McDougal and others to the study of law and life is
essentially a natural law philosophy because, despite McDougal's
claim that his values are objectively those which are held by the
majority of the community as determined by empirical social
science surveys, he nonetheless insists that the values which he has
identified ought to be shared as widely throughout the world as
possible, "resting on respect for human dignity as a supervalue."I"
Whether Friedmann would agree with Bodenheimer's
55. C(. INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (E. Kozhevnikov, ed., 1957) (emphasis added).
56. Falk, Book Review, 3 COLU.I. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 256 (1965).
57. F. Mann, supra note 54, at 307.
58. C(J. especially, M. McDougal & W. Reisman, supra note 54. See also Miller,
Book Review, 65 COLu~I. L. REV. 836 (1965).
59. Horvath, Book Review, 16 AMER. J. Coip. L. 440, 442 (1968) calls
Friedmann's contribution to legal philosophy "'an unfinished symphony."
60. E. BODENHEINIER. JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1967). After reading the McDougal &
Reisman review, supra note 54, one is tempted to conclude that it is necessary to add as
another "supervalue" to the McDougalian system the imperativeness that legal research
scholars accept and carefully apply McDougal's "'policy-science" methodology!
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classification of "policy-science" or not, he is distrustful of
natural law thought and has called it " . . . human arrogance
clothed in supernatural wisdom.""' Sympathetic to the relativist
pragmatism of Holmes, Friedmann has stated:
The life of mankind has been a continuous struggle for the
implementation of conflicting philosophies and principles of
life, and it requires a remarkable degree of self-assurance to
know that one's own political philosophy, whether
implemented in a majority or a minority of legal systems,
represents the order of God or Nature, while the rest of
62
mankind stands condemned.
While rejecting the conceptualism of natural law, Friedmann
has used some very abstract phrases himself in explaining his
approach to international law. As noted above, Friedmann's
conflict-cooperation analysis is understandable in terms of a
search to achieve "the national interest." What does "national
interest" mean? And who shall determine what this phrase means,
Friedmann or someone else? How is such a decision made? What
conflicting values are at stake? Is "national interest" another way
of restating the Thomistic concept of the "common good"? The
conscious and explicit development of value preferences as they
relate to the normative elements of a scholarly analysis is not
only helpful to the interested reader or decision maker; it is
absolutely vital. Articulating some of his values, Friedmann
states:
It may indeed be maintained that all law is a law made
by human being for human beings, and that the respect for
the human being, as an individual rather than an object to be
disposed of at will, is a foundation of all social, and therefore
of legal, relations. This may lead to a condemnation of such
extremes of barbarism as the Nazi extermination decrees
leading to the murder and degradation of millions of human
beings, in gas ovens, concentration camps and slave labour
establishments, as not deserving of the attributes of any legal
order, as contrary to "natural law." The same result may be
reached, however, by stating that murder or torture are
international crimes, since all civilised legal systems treat
them as criminal offences of the gravest kind. Beyond such
elementary postulates, the manner in which political societies
61. Friedmann, Book Review. 3 NATURAL L. FORUM 208, 210 (1958).
62. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 50, at 79.
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have, since the dawn of civilisation, regulated their economic
and social affairs, is a matter of clashing philosophies, values
and interests. Any attempt to stamp a particular social order
as being consonant with nature, and correspondingly, another
as being contrary to nature, is a disguised way of giving the
halo of perpetuity and sacrosanctity to a particular political
3
or legal philosophy
Impliedly, Friedmann is suggesting his preference for a
positivistic yet flexible ordering of international affairs. He seeks
to avoid the intellectual arrogance that has sometimes
characterized the dogmatic assertion of natural law thinkers that
their reasonable solutions to human problems represent the will
of God or the reflection of some natural universal principle of
human nature. Such striving for humility can only be admired
and commended. Honestly, consistently and conscientiously
pursued, it is doubtless more pleasing to God than the
uncharitable imposition of human will in the name of divine
wisdom. But the embrace of natural law need not necessarily
lead to arrogance and intolerance. It depends on the total
constitution of the thinker, including his complete psychological
and intellectual make-up.
In searching for the rule of law, men have endeavored to
base their decisions on some factor other than their own naked
power and authority. Principles of truth, right and justice have
been articulated and given concrete meaning by the decision
maker, whose decision may or may not be reviewable before the
bar of civil society. Someone has to decide, and the question
would seem to be how to avoid making the wrong decision.
Rules and abstract principles are absolutely necessary, but they
are not self-operatively adequate. So Friedmann stated:
• .. there are deep disagreements as to the extent to which
the norms of international law should be regarded as a
superior set of values, where they conflict with what the
particular author regards as national interest."
Here, Friedmann recognized the ambiguity of the phrase
'national interest' and goes on to criticize the use 5 of abstract
63. Id. at 77-78.
64. Friedmann, Law and Politics in the Vietnamese War: A Comntent, 61 A.J.T.L.
776, 778 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Wolfgang Friedmann].
65. See Moore, The Laifitness of Military Assistance to the Republic oJ Vietnam.,
61 A. J. INT'L L. 1 (1967).
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McDougalian expressions such as "minimum world public order"
and "fundamental community prescriptions":
[l]n the absence of third-party determination, "minimum
world public order" means Humpty-Dumpty-like, what the
policy-maker wants it to mean, a catch-all phrase to justify
whatever action the writer wishes to justify 6
Is this a manifestation of what Pound has referred to as a
'give-it-up' philosophy?6 7 Or is it more particularly an attempt to
point out the sematic shortcomings to which even a carefully
developed goal-oriented policy-science is prone?
Moore, in replying to this critique by Friedmann, counters:
No formula or approach, whether policy-oriented or the most
pedantic search for "black and white" rules, guarantees
"correct" results in analysis of complex issues of international
law or the same result when applied by different scholars. All
suffer alike from the absence of third-party determination.
Yet Professor Friedmann's suspicion of policy analysis
suggests both that he believes that a search for 'black and
white' rules offers greater certainty of "correct" results and
that he thinks consciously or unconsciously that policy
justification is unnecessary and even dangerous. But there are
strong reasons for suggesting that the available range of
complementary norms of international law makes a simplistic
rule application a more dangerous exercise (dangerous in the
sense of ease of manipulation of result) when dealing with
complex major issues than the conscious application of norms
in the light of their function6
After following this exchange, one is reminded of President
Levi's query "of whether philosophy of law has anything to
contribute to the good of the legal profession, the law, or the
world." The Moore-Friedmann exchange is not even resolved in
the presence of a third-party determination, for the same issues
would clearly confront the third party! Those interested in the
outcome of the decision of this third party would certainly like

66. Wolfgang Friedmann, supra note 64, at 783.
67. Pound, Philosophy of Law and Comparative Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16

(1951).
68. Moore, Law and Politics in the Vietnamese War: A Response to Professor
Friedmann,61 AN:. J. INT'L L. 1039, 1051-52 (1967).

69. Levi, Book Review, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. 426, 427 (1950).
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to know who he is and to what value system he subscribes. It is
thus impossible to separate ethics from the law. 0

Wortley, in his book under review, outlines an historical
development of theories of international law from the ancient
world to the present day, concluding that "The international
legal order is composed of the family of States; its rules are
designed to secure peace with justice."'" To learn what the

author means by justice, the reader has to wait until a later
chapter, when that theme is discussed within the context of a
2
hypothetical judicial decision influenced by Aristotelian ethics
So Wortley: "A discussion of the nature of justice is best
introduced by considering the function of the impartial judge in
any legal order. 73 The author believes that the starting point of
an international lawyer "is that there can be, in objective justice,
an answer to any human conflict." 74 To quote a famous
diplomatic dispatch:
There is indeed no mystery about international law: it is
nothing more than the recognition between Nations of the
rules of right and fair dealing such as ordinarily obtain
between individuals and which are essential for friendly
75
intercourse.
There are plenty of rules; the problem is "to reconcile them into

some just form of co-existence and of harmonious relationship,"
a task which the author dispatches in the ten pages of Chapter 9!
70. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUMt. L.
REV. 809, 849 (1935) interprets as follows:
The positive task of descriptive legal science cannot, therefore, be
entirely separated from the task of legal criticism. The collection of social
facts without a selective criterion of human values produces horrid wilderness
of useless statistics. The relation between positive legal science and legal
criticism is not a relation of temporal priority, but of mutual dependence.
Legal criticism is empty without objective description of the causes and
consequences of legal decisions. Legal description is blind without the guiding
light of a theory of values. It is through the union of objective legal science
and a critical theory of social values that our understanding of the human
significance of law will be enriched. It is loyalty to this union of distinct
disciplines that will mark whatever is of lasting importance in contemporary
legal science and legal philosophy.
71. B. WORTLEY, supra note 19, at 162.
72. Id. at 349.
73. Id. at 355.
74. Id. at 162.
75. Id.
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Theoretically, Wortley's heart is in the right place. The
Aristotelian and Thomistic principles to which he refers are
eternally sound. But he does not even begin to make a systematic
application of them to the contemporary problems of
international living. For example, consider the Thomistic
doctrine that war may be validly waged for a just cause and a
just intention. 76 Or, examine therewith the ancient Roman rule
granting the right of self defense as a last resort, a principle
which seems to be incorporated into Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter.77 How would Wortley apply these rules to
decide the respective claims of Israel and her Arab neighbors
with respect to the Six Day War of 1967? While his short answer
to such questions would be interesting, the detailed methodology
which he might employ in reaching the answer would be of even
greater significance. The values expressed by Aristotle and
Aquinas are fine in the abstract. Who could take exception to
them? They have been carefully and thoroughly thought through
by two of the greatest minds who have ever contributed to the development of human knowledge. The task for this generation of
jurists is to relate them in detail to each value process, taking each
potential decision to see whether, in immediate as well as potential
future effect, it corresponds to the ethical goals of the socially
responsible analyst.
Bodenheimer, while recognizing the conceptual and practical
difficulties in formulating and implementing a system of
international law, is nonetheless mildly optimistic. His version of
international law is one in which the pursuit of justice and order
go hand-in-hand. Addressing himself to the question of whether
the national sovereign has exclusive jurisdiction over his subjects,
or whether some extra-national juridical entity may validly
76. Id. at 145.
77. Id. at 160. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states:
Article 51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present

Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security.

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 5I.
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intervene in the international affairs of a state which allegedly is
denying fundamental human rights to its citizens, Bodenheimer
states:
The history of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
shows that human beings in one national unit are by no
means disinterested in, or impassive to, the treatment of
human beings subject to another sovereignty. Men are by
nature disinclined to consider sovereign state power as a
supreme, ultimate fact of international life which eclipses or
eliminates the need for concern with individual human values
and well-being. As civilization advances, men come to feel to
an increasing extent that "fundamental human rights are
rights superior to the law of soverign states."''
To be sure, such intervention would have to be restricted to
cases involving "extreme instances of outrageous governmental
conduct," and whatever value it might have in preventing the
alleged abuse of human rights would have to be weighed against
the disadvantages inherent in the risk of provoking war.
International agreements providing for such intervention would
constitute the best technical manner of validation, provided that
adequate procedures for the enforcement of such covenants are
also made available. Bodenheimer additionally perceived the need
for "an almost worldwide campaign designed to strengthen the
conscience of mankind ' 79 before such ideas can bear fruition.
Thus, identification of the common conscience must first be
preceded by a tendentious effort to shape it. This presents a task of
enormous difficulty and complexity. How are U.S. jurists, for
example, to strengthen the conscience of Soviet leaders with
respect to alleged violations by the Soviet Union of the fundamental human rights of individual Czech citizens? There is considerable evidence that the August 1968 Soviet-led invasion of
Czechoslovakia resulted in the loss or drastic curtailment there of
what we here in the United States call first amendment rights8
The Russians felt that they were restoring an intolerable situation
to "normalcy." From their point of view (Russian, Marxist,
Leninist, Stalinist) they doubtless felt that what they did was
78. E. BODIENHEINIER, supra note 29, at 235-36.
79. Id. at 236.
80. (/. Levy, "'The Short, Happy Life of Prague's Free Press," N.Y. Times
September 8, 1968, (Magazine) at 34; Werth, The Censorship War: What Moscow Fears,
THE NATION, Sept. 16, 1968, at 230.
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necessary. But was it compatible with the international legal
doctrine of non-invervention in the internal affairs of other
sovereign States?
Speaking to the American Society of International Law in
Washington, D.C. in April 1968, some four months before his
country's troops invaded Czechoslovakia, Evgeny N. Nasinovsky,
Legal Adviser of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations,
explained:
With regard to such a cardinal principle of international law
as the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of
other states .. .the USSR has assumed a noble role of its

guardian and of the champion of its strict observance~l
And further:
The Soviet State, supporting the concept of universally
recognized international law has been consistently defending
the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
states; it strongly rejects the idea of imposing revolution from
abroad; it will never send a soldier to impose its will on
another country? Another Soviet representative, Yuri Zhukov, the foreign
editor of Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, told the Dutch political weekly Haagse Post
two months later that NATO was "a completely useless affair."
He further suggested that the same might be said of the Warsaw
Pact, the provisions of which were of course invoked to supply
an aura of legality to the Soviet-led occupation of
Czechoslovakia. Zhukov's proposal:
We must dissolve the two blocs and organize a system of
European cooperation, economically, scientifically, culturally
and even politicallyY
To informed observers of Soviet foreign policy and of Soviet-West
European relations in particular, the statements of Nasinovsky
and Zhukov should come as no surprise. Even if he had actually
known of plans to occupy Czechoslovokia by military force,
Nasinovsky would probably not characterize them as violative of
81. Nasinovsky, The Impact oJ FiJty Years o] Soviet Theory aiid Practice on
International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
189, 193 (1968).
82. Id. at 195.
June 28, 1968, at 20.
83. TitNu:.
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the principle of noninterference at all. Where the mutual

relations of socialist states are concerned, Soviet jurists apply a
special

Marxist-Leninist principle of self-determination of

nations which, coupled with the objective content assigned to the
concept of non-intervention as it applies to nations within the
socialist commonwealth, provide, as Ramundo has noted, "an
institutional basis for interference in internal affairs in the
greater interest of the socialist commonwealth." 4 Zhukov's
remarks to the Dutch journalists reflect a long-standing objective
of Soviet policy vis-a-vis the European Economic Community,
namely, to de-emphasize the positive features of regional
economic cooperation in Western Europe, emphasizing the even

greater benefits which would allegedly result from an allEuropean effort in which the U.S.S.R. would play a leading
role.
Rather surprising, however, was Zhukov's misreading of
the then contemporary scene, 6 in particular his assessment of the

viability of the doctrine of military intervention based on a
regional defense pact. Perhaps also surprising, in light of the
alleged desires of the Soviet leaders to foster a spirit of fraternal
84. Ramundo, The Socialist Theory of International Law, INSTITUTE FOR SINO41 (1964). This institutional base
was subsequently incorporated into the post facto Brezhnev Doctrine: "The Soviet Union
asserts the right to intervene in any member country of the Socialist Commonwealth
where the purity or supremacy of the party might be threatened," TIIE, October 18,
1968, at 29; see NEWSWEEK, November 25, 1968, at 46. The Brezhnev Doctrine must be
regarded as important supplementary codicil material to the Warsaw Pact, Articles I
(renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes) and 8 (nonintervention in internal
affairs) of which would otherwise seem to condemn the Soviet-led move into
SOVIET STUDIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Czechoslovakia as violative of that agreement. See Lawson,
ORGANIZATIONS 207, 209 (1962).

INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL

85. This stance was evident at the time when the Common Market was being
established. In 1957 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern for the
political and economic future of Europe and called for the establishment of organizations
designed to integrate and coordinate the entire European economy. See the statement to
the press by the Soviet Foreign Ministry concerning the European Common Market and

Euratom,

March 16, 1957, in

DOCUMENTS

ON

INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS

448 (N.

Frankland, ed., 1960). "'The Soviet Union is convinced that a genuine solution of the
economic problems affecting each European country . . . cannot be found through the
establishment of new exclusive organizations by this or that group of countries opposed
to the other European countries. This solution can and should be found on an allEuropean basis through the use of the already existing organizations of an all-European
nature or through the establishment of new European organizations on terms acceptable
to all European countries regardless of their social system."
86. Already by June, 1968 the liberalization program of the Dubcek government in
Czechoslovakia was drawing heavy fire in the Soviet press, including Pravda. See Merrill,
Czechoslovakia's New Course, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1968, at 19-23.
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cooperation among countries, is the following reportorial
account of how Soviet representatives treated the leaders of the
Czechoslovak state:
Gradually, what had really happened in Moscow was made
known and the humiliation of Dubcek and the government
exposed. On the morning of the invasion, Soviet troops had
kicked their way into the room where Dubcek was meeting with
the other leaders. The Soviets hauled them out of their chairs
and frisked them roughly for weapons. Then they forced
Dubcek and the others to lean against the wall, supporting
themselves on their hands and remaining in that painful position for more than two hours. During that time, a Soviet officer
stole Dubcek's wristwatch. Later in the day, the Soviets
clamped Dubcek and the others into handcuffs and took each
of them to separate places of internment. Abused, ill-fed, not
knowing what fate awaited
them, they were kept in total
87
isolation for three days
As John Hazard once observed: "The nature of socialist
international law is determined, then, not by the norms it
' 88
applies, but by the aims it seeks to achieve.
From the events of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia the
world has been afforded some insight into the nature of socialist
international law. 9 It is certainly goal-oriented, the goal being
the preservation and enhancement of the welfare of the Soviet
Bloc as that is interpreted by the leaders of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. And that assessment of common welfare is
inevitably bound up with self-defense. Perhaps the Russians are
overly sensitive to the risks and potential danger of an attack on
their way of life from the West." But how can we convince them
87. TIN E, September 6, 1968, at 34.
88. Hazard, Soviet Socialism as a Public Order System, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 39 (1959).
89. The Soviet position is briefly outlined by Reis, Legal Aspects of the Invasion
and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 399-400; and forms part of
the discussion by Cooper, U.N. Legal Committee Discusses the Question of Defining
Aggression. 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 664-72 (1968).
90. National self defense and Realpolitik are sometime bedfellows. See Kahn, How
to Think About the Russians, 78 FORTUNE, at 124 (1968), where the author discourses,
inter alia, on the fear of the Russian military that the United States might encourage
%Vest Germany to attack the U.S.S.R. through Czechoslovakia. Former U.S. Secretary
of State, Dean Acheson, made the following comment:
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not a legal
issue. The power, position and prestige of the United States had been
challenged by another state; and law simply does not deal with such questions
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that these fears are groundless? How can we influence their
collective conscience so that it will recognize the suppression of
individual freedoms as a greater evil than the threat to their
security which the exercise of such freedoms entails? That would
require an extraordinarily talented campaign and it is more than
probable that our own leaders would like to know how to wage
it!
Even if our leaders were to enter into a formal multilateral
written agreement with the U.S.S.R. and other countries
renouncing, for instance, the use of force to settle disputes and
affirming the doctrine of nonintervention in the internal affairs
of other countries unless intervention were deemed to be
necessary in order to protect human rights, difficulties would
eventually arise in the interpretation of such provisions. This
would be so even if all signatory powers were heirs to the
principal ideals of our Judeo-Christian civilization. The problem
is compounded when the disputants are of different social and
economic systems. As an example of the dangerousness of
agreeing with the Russians on the basis of concepts such as
"justice under law," George Kennan has given us the benefit of
his impressions of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement:
It will be understood, against the background of these
convictions, that I viewed the labors of the Potsdam
Conference with unmitigated skepticism and despair. I cannot
recall any political document the reading of which filled me
with a greater sense of depression than the communique to
which President Truman set his name at the conclusion of
those confused and unreal discussions. It was not just the
knowledge that the principles of joint quadrupartite control,
which were now supposed to form the basis for the
administration of Germany, were unreal and unworkable. The
use in an agreement with the Russians of general
of ultimate power-power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty. I
cannot believe that there are principles of law that say we must accept
destruction of our way of life. One would be surprised if practical men.
trained in legal history and thought, had devised and brought to a state of
general acceptance a principle condemnatory of an action so essential to the
continuation of pre-eminent power as that taken by the United States last
October. Such a principle would be as harmful to the development of
restraining procedures as it would be futile. No law can destroy the state
creating the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law.
Remarks on Cuba, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OP INTERNATIONAL LAW,
13, 14 (1963).
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language-such words as "democratic," "peaceful," and
"justice"--went directly counter to everything I had learned,
in seventeen years of experience with Russian affairs, about
the technique of dealing with the Soviet government. The
assertion, for example, that we and the Russians were going
to cooperate in reorganizing German education on the basis
of "democratic ideas" carried inferences wholly unjustifiable
in the light of everything we knew about the mental world of
the Soviet leadership and about the state of education in
Russia at that time. Even more shocking was the announced
intention on our part to collaberate with the Soviet
government in reorganizing the German judicial system "in
accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under
law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of
race, nationality or religion." For the further statement that
"democratic" political parties would be not only permitted
but "encouraged" to function throughout Germany "with
rights of assembly and of public discussion" it is difficult to
find any ameliorating explanation whatsoever. Anyone in
Moscow could have told our negotiators what it was that the
Soviet leaders had in mind when they used the term
"democratic parties." Not even the greatest naivete could
excuse the confusion worked on public understanding in
Germany itself and the other Western countries by the use of
this term in a document signed by Stalin as well as Messrs.
Truman and Attlee."
This is American Legal Realism in action! It points out in
dramatic fashion the inadequacies of a jurisprudence of concepts.
It underscores the need for all negotiating parties to make
absolutely clear to everyone just what it is they intend to
accomplish with the agreement. Agreements are technical
methods for achieving desired goals. Negotiation should be
primarily goal-oriented; secondarily rule-oriented. Only on the
basis of such a theory is it possible to conduct meaningful
2
negotiations with the Soviet Union
91. G. KENNAN. MEMloIRs 1925-1950, at 258-59 (1967).
92. See also Cooper, supra note 89, at 668, citing the September 25, 1968 issue of
Pravda, wherein the Soviet press explained away charges that the occupation constituted
a violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and international law, concluding with the
following statement: "Laws and legal norms are subjected to the laws of the class
struggle, the laws of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in MarxistLeninist teaching.... Formal juridical reasoning must not overshadow a class
approach."
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CONCLUSION

The books under review represent the considered reflections
of three competent and capable academicians on some of the
most engaging and perplexing problems of jurisprudence. We are
indebted to them for the imaginative and perceptive manner with
which they have treated the complex subject matter of
profoundly difficult areas of intellectual endeavor. All write with
clarity, a circumstance which cleanly reveals the strengths and
weaknesses of their epistemological and axiological postures.
Friedmann's succinct summaries of the principal contributions of
the leading legal philosophers are excellent.93 Bodenheimer's
search for objective standards of justice is bold and thoughtprovoking. Often this reviewer found himself in agreement with
the author, even when Bodenheimer was making the most
dogmatic conclusory statements. Wortley's vigorous affirmation
of Thomistic legal philosophy is refreshing and stimulating,
especially coming from a country the majority of whose jurists are
still suffering from an exaggerated exposure to Austinian
positivism. A more complete reaction to the sweeping currents
and cross-currents of the ideas and men which are discussed in
these books would extend beyond the confines of an already
lengthy review. The reader is urged to form his own impressions
by settling down with these informative, enlightening and
valuable books.
93. Bodenheimer has also done an outstanding job in this respect. See supra note 60,
at 3-157. Based upon their brevity, selectivity, and fairness, I strongly recommend both to
my students in Jurisprudence as collateral reading.

